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The Liberal Tightrope: Brettschneider
on Free Speech
Sarah Song†
INTRODUCTION
Corey Brettschneider’s book takes up one of the most
important questions in moral, political, and legal philosophy—
what are the grounds and limits of toleration—by focusing on
the problem of hate speech. I admire his aspiration of crafting a
middle position that defends robust free speech protections
while also subjecting those espousing hateful viewpoints to
“democratic persuasion.”
Brettschneider begins with a critique of two dominant
responses offered by political and legal theorists to the problem
of hate speech. On the one hand, you have the “neutralists”
who defend strong rights of free speech, including protections
for “hateful viewpoints,” which he defines as “hostile to the core
ideals of liberal democracy.”1 On the other, you have the
“prohibitionists” who endorse coercive bans on hate speech.2
The first approach is reflected in the “United States Supreme
Court’s current free speech jurisprudence,” whereas the second is
“found in most liberal democracies outside the United States.”3
Brettschneider argues that both approaches are problematic.
Neutralists fail to take seriously the ways in which hateful
viewpoints undermine the ideal of free and equal citizenship.
Prohibitionists disregard the autonomy of citizens, their capacity
to choose, revise, and pursue their own conceptions of the good.
Brettschneider proposes a middle path between these two
positions, based on a distinction “between a state’s coercive power,
or its ability to place legal limits on hate speech, and its expressive
† Professor of Law and Associate Professor of Political Science, U.C. Berkeley.
1 COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, WHEN THE STATE SPEAKS, WHAT SHOULD IT SAY?
HOW DEMOCRACIES CAN PROTECT EXPRESSION AND PROMOTE EQUALITY 1 (2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
2 Id.
3 Id.
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power, or its ability to influence beliefs and behavior by ‘speaking’
to hate groups and the larger society.”4 The state should refrain
from using its coercive capacity against groups espousing hateful
viewpoints in the name of respecting freedom of expression while
simultaneously criticizing such groups in its expressive capacity in
the name of respecting equal citizenship. Such a middle path
provides a more nuanced approach but it is also like walking a
tightrope. Teeter too far in one direction and you endanger liberty;
lean too far the other way and you sacrifice equality.
Another way of characterizing the aim of Brettschneider’s
book is in terms of two liberal dystopias to be avoided. For
neutralists, the summum malum is the Invasive State where
government officials constantly monitor and punish citizens for
speaking or acting on beliefs contrary to the ideal of free and
equal citizenship. By contrast, prohibitionists fear something
different: the Hateful Society in which robust liberal rights
protections permit a thousand hateful viewpoints to bloom.
Brettschneider argues we should guard against both dystopias.
He agrees with the neutralists that the state should not
coercively infringe upon free speech and privacy rights, but he
also sides with the prohibitionists in recommending that the state
actively engage in “democratic persuasion,” which involves
criticizing and even condemning hateful viewpoints. When the
state “speaks,” it should not only remind citizens of the content of
rights; it should also present the reasons for rights. The reasons
for the liberal rights of freedom of speech, association, and
religion are none other than the values of freedom and equality at
the core of liberal democracy. Any moral or religious viewpoints
incompatible with these core values are properly subject to
“democratic persuasion” even while being shielded from coercion.
My focus in this essay is to develop and amplify concerns
that prohibitionists, on one side, and neutralists, on the other,
will continue to have about Brettschneider’s “third alternative.”
To build a middle position aimed at addressing the concerns of two
opposing sides inevitably means building a framework around a
tension. Each side has reason to think Brettschneider’s position
betrays its core concerns to appease the other side. Are they right?
4 Id. at 3.
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I. THE PROHIBITIONISTOBJECTION: DEMOCRATIC
PERSUASIONDOESN’TGO FAR ENOUGH
The traditional liberal approach to drawing the limits of
state regulation has been based on a spatial metaphor between
“the public” and “the private.” On this view, certain “spaces” of
life—the family, the market, churches, and voluntary
associations—are deemed to be private spaces and thereby free
of state regulation. Building on the work of feminist theorists,
Brettschneider argues that no space is immune from state
regulation. The state can override privacy rights wherever those
rights are exercised in ways that violate the rights of others.
This point is pithily captured by the feminist slogan, “the
personal is political.”
In lieu of the spatial metaphor, Brettschneider offers what
he calls the “principle of public relevance” to determine the limits of
the state regulation.5 “What makes certain beliefs and practices
publicly relevant is that they conflict with our public status as free
and equal citizens.”6 In cases of conflict, personal beliefs and
actions “ideally should be changed to make them consistent with
the ideal of free and equal citizenship.”7 To implement the principle
of public relevance, we need to answer a prior question: what is
required to treat others as free and equal citizens?
In fleshing out the ideal of free and equal citizenship,
Brettschneider seems most concerned to show how minimalist
that ideal is. Following John Rawls, the leading liberal philosopher
of the twentieth century, he characterizes his principle of public
relevance as “political, not metaphysical.” It “is not ‘deep’ in terms
of either its justification or the types of beliefs to which it applies.”8
To demonstrate why the ideal is not deep, Brettschneider
elaborates the kind of freedom and equality that is required:
According to value democracy, citizens must be treated as having
equal status in that the rights of all citizens must be equally
respected. These rights include freedom of expression, association,
and religion, as well as rights of political participation and the rule
of law. Citizens are to be regarded as “free” in the sense of being able
to possess and exercise the rights of citizenship.9
The “political, not metaphysical” move appeals to many
contemporary liberals for the familiar reasons Rawls gave.
5 Id. at 26.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 30.
9 Id. at 31.
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Political liberals aim to develop political principles that could be
acceptable to citizens who hold a wide variety of comprehensive
moral and religious doctrines. Democratic societies are
characterized by the fact of reasonable pluralism—the plurality
of comprehensive doctrines that people hold is reasonable
because when people are left to judge for themselves on
fundamental moral and religious questions, they inevitably
come to different conclusions due to what Rawls calls the
“burdens of judgment.”10 Rawls’s Political Liberalism offers a
political conception of justice that may command widespread
agreement in the form of an overlapping consensus in spite of
the fact of reasonable pluralism. A political conception of
justice is “political” in virtue of being presented independently
of any comprehensive moral doctrines and because it is worked
out from fundamental ideas seen as implicit in the public
political culture of a democratic society.11 Brettschneider’s value
democracy, like Rawls’s political liberalism, requires all citizens
to accept the core values of free and equal citizenship but not
any comprehensive moral or religious doctrines. Rawls himself
maintained that among the core values of liberal democracy “are
the freedom and equality of women, the equality of children as
future citizens, [and] the freedom of religion.”12
Here is the objection I want to raise with “political, not
metaphysical” approaches on behalf of “prohibitionists.” I draw
here on the feminist political theorist Susan Okin’s critique of
Rawls. Okin emphasized that political liberals’ “toleration of a
wide range” of personal beliefs and practices tends to come at the
expense of the equality of women.13
Many political liberals, including Brettschneider, respond
that public toleration of a plurality of moral and religious doctrines
is conditional on those doctrines being compatible with the ideal of
free and equal citizenship. That is a crucial limit of liberal
toleration. In fleshing out the ideal of free and equal citizenship,
Brettschneider says it requires recognizing citizens as “politically
autonomous and equal.”He sums it up this way:
In short, the “freedom” in free and equal citizenship requires respect
for both the political and personal autonomy that citizens need to
10 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 54-58 (2005).
11 Id. at 12-13.
12 John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in COLLECTED PAPERS
573, 601 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
13 For extended analysis of Okin’s critique of Rawls with a focus on religious
associations, see Sarah Song, Religious Freedom vs. Sex Equality, 4 THEORY & RES. IN
EDUC. 23, 24 (2006).
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develop opinions about politics and the good life. The “equal” in free
and equal citizenship reflects a concern to ensure that these capacities
are respected equally regardless of one’s race, ethnicity, or gender.14
Brettschneider points to slavery, segregation, and race-
and sex-based exclusion from the vote as clear violations of the
ideal of free and equal citizenship. But what about less clear-
cut cases that involve doctrines supporting inequalities based
on race, sex, and sexual orientation that are perpetuated
within families and houses of worship?
Take, for example, the case of the Catholic Church’s
prohibition of female priests. Insofar as the Church does not
directly oppose the equal status of women in society at large,
Brettschneider says it should not be subject to democratic
persuasion. If it were to advocate policies that dissuade women
from serving in public life, however, the case for cutting off state-
funded tax privileges becomes stronger. In Brettschneider’s view,
the state’s subsidy power is a tool of persuasion, not coercion, and
the state should withhold subsidies from groups that violate the
ideal of free and equal citizenship. In the case of the Catholic
Church, Brettschneider argues that the Church should be immune
from democratic persuasion because whether the Church’s policies
are actively opposed to the ideal of free and equal citizenship is
“ambiguous” at best. Democratic persuasion should be restricted
“to clear instances in which the ideal of free and equal citizenship is
opposed.”15 He imposes this “substance-based limit” on democratic
persuasion to appease the worries of neutralist liberals, but in
doing so, does he betray his other commitment to combating the
spread of inequality-breeding doctrines?
I think Brettschneider is too quick in dismissing the
state’s use of democratic persuasion in this case. Why should the
ambiguity of a case not trigger democratic persuasion instead of
ruling it out? A fuller appreciation of the feminist slogan “the
personal is political” requires recognizing that the influence runs
in both directions. The slogan stands not only for the proposition
that public regulation of private beliefs and practices is
sometimes justified, but also that private beliefs and practices
strongly shape political life. Okin emphasizes the latter when
she says, “it is exceedingly difficult to see how one could both
hold and practice (in one’s personal, familial, and associational
life) the belief that women or blacks, say, are naturally inferior,
without its seriously affecting one’s capacity to relate
14 BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 35.
15 Id. at 135.
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(politically) to such people as citizens ‘free and equal’ with
oneself.”16 We need not agree with Okin’s characterization of
the world’s major religions as “rife with sexism” in order to
share her view that privately held beliefs strongly shape
women’s access to citizenship rights.17 Ensuring the worth of
the equal rights of citizenship for women requires supportive
social mores. This private–public dependence led Okin to a
conclusion contrary to Brettschneider’s: that the state should
withdraw tax-exempt status from the Catholic Church or any
religious association “as long as they discriminate against
women” in all its most important hiring decisions and in the
distribution of institutional power.18 The question, then, for
Brettschneider’s value democracy is why the Church should be
immune from democratic persuasion when its position on
gender-based leadership roles is “ambiguous” at best.
We can amplify this feminist objection by considering
the curious asymmetry among many political liberals in their
treatment of race, as opposed to sex, discrimination in familial
and associational life. In addition to discussing the Catholic
Church’s ban on women from the priesthood, Brettschneider
discusses Bob Jones University’s ban on interracial dating.19 He
says “Bob Jones University is a prime illustration of when a
religious organization should not be given the tax privileges of non-
profit status, because of its opposition to the ideal of free and equal
citizenship.”20 Why does Bob Jones University’s policy trigger
democratic persuasion while the Catholic Church’s policy does not?
In spelling out further inquiry that might be pursued in
these cases, Brettschneider says we should examine the
Catholic Church’s current attitudes toward public officeholders
who are women. Yet, he suggests a rosier picture than seems
warranted when he says the Church “often celebrates Catholic
women who attain high political office,” without providing any
evidence.21 By contrast, in the case of Bob Jones University,
Brettschneider says “[a] more conclusive inquiry should ask
whether [the university] could have some principled reason for
16 Susan Moller Okin, Political Liberalism, Justice, and Gender, 105 ETHICS
23, 29 n.16 (1994).
17 Susan Moller Okin, Justice and Gender: An Unfinished Debate, 72 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1537, 1556 (2004); see also SUSANMOLLER OKIN, ISMULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR
WOMEN? 12-17 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999).
18 Susan Moller Okin, “Mistresses of Their Own Destiny”: Group Rights,
Gender, and Realistic Rights of Exit, 112 ETHICS 205, 230 n.68 (2002).
19 See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 580 (1983).
20 BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 137.
21 Id. at 135.
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believing its prohibition on interracial dating was compatible
with an endorsement of the legality of interracial marriage,”
and he registers his doubt that any such justification is
available.22 Why not apply a similar inquiry to the Catholic
Church? Such an inquiry would involve addressing questions
such as: What are the principled reasons for banning women from
the priesthood, and what do they imply for Catholic women’s
attainment of leadership positions both inside and outside the
Church? Are those reasons really compatible with respecting
women as free and equal citizens? Without hearing more, we are
left to ponder why Brettschneider’s theory, like that of many
political liberals, appears tougher on race-based, as opposed to
sex-based, discrimination.
II. THENEUTRALISTOBJECTION: DEMOCRATIC
“PERSUASION” IS COERCION
Perhaps the most innovative aspect of Brettschneider’s
theory of value democracy is the use of the state’s taxing and
spending power as a key tool for responding to hateful viewpoints.
The innovative claim is not so much that the state should use its
subsidy power to respond to the problem of hate speech, but
rather that we ought to view the state’s use of subsidies as an
instance of democratic persuasion, not coercion. This claim
depends, of course, on your conception of coercion and persuasion.
Brettschneider adopts the philosopher Robert Nozick’s
influential account of coercion, which he interprets “as the
state threatening to impose a sanction or punishment on an
individual or group of individuals with the aim of prohibiting a
particular action, expression, or holding of a belief.”23 I wish he
had dug a bit deeper into Nozick’s account because there are some
problems that it raises for his argument. On Nozick’s account,
P coerces Q if and only if:
1. P aims to keep Q from choosing to perform action A;
2. P communicates a claim to Q;
3. P’s claim indicates that if Q performs A, then P will bring about
some consequence that would make Q’s A-ing less desirable to Q
than Q’s not A-ing;
22 Id. at 162.
23 Id. at 88.
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4. P’s claim is credible to Q;
5. Q does not do A;
6. Part of Q’s reason for not doing A is to lessen the likelihood that
P will bring about the consequence announced in (3).24
On Nozick’s definition, the law criminalizing murder is a
clear instance of coercion. An individual may choose not to
commit murder because the state has made clear that it will
impose harsh criminal penalties against him if he does so. The
state also engages in coercion if it aims to prevent a group from
associating and speaking out by threatening imprisonment or a
fine as a consequence. As Brettschneider explains, “State coercion
is employed in an attempt to deny the ability to make a choice. By
contrast, financial inducements like pure persuasion, clearly
attempt to convince citizens to make a particular choice, but they
do not deny the citizen the right to reject it.”25 So when the state
decides to withdraw state funding from a group espousing hateful
viewpoints, the state is engaging in persuasion, not coercion.
Upon closer examination, however, democratic “persuasion”
by threat of withholding state funding does appear to be an
instance of coercion on Nozick’s definition. The state aims to keep
hateful groups from choosing to perform a particular action
(holding and espousing the hateful viewpoint). The state
communicates this claim to the group, indicating that if the
group continues to hold and espouse the hateful viewpoint, the
state will bring about the consequence of withdrawing state
funding from the group. To resist this conclusion, Brettschneider
needs to stipulate a narrower category of “consequences” that
the state can bring about in order to make it less desirable for
hateful groups to hold hateful viewpoints. He attempts
something like this when he interprets Nozick’s view in terms of
imposing “a sanction or punishment.” Similarly, when he says
there are “means-based” limits on democratic persuasion, he
suggests the state cannot use coercion to prohibit expression,
by which he seems to mean direct infringement on the basic
rights of free speech, association, and conscience.26 But
Brettschneider’s argument is at odds with Nozick’s view of
24 Scott Anderson, Coercion, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
§ 2.1 (Edward N. Zalta ed., Winter ed. 2011) (citing Robert Nozick, Coercion, in
PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ERNEST NAGEL 440, 441-45
(Sidney Morgenbess et al. eds., 1969), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/coercion/#NozNewAppCoe.
25 BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 112.
26 Id. at 87.
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coercion which notably diverged from prior accounts by excluding
direct use of force and associating coercion only with proposals or
conditional threats and by requiring that a judgment about
coercion refer to facts about the coercee’s psychology. If we inquire
into the psychology of an association faced with the state’s threat
of withdrawing state subsidy, it seems reasonable to think it
would view the state’s threat as an instance of coercion.
Brettschneider might respond to this objection by saying
he adopts the spirit, not the letter, of Nozick’s account. So let me
raise two additional arguments to cast doubt on his claim that the
state’s use of its spending power is mere persuasion, not coercion.
The first has to do with the distinction between a liberty
and the “worth” of that liberty. Rawls makes this distinction in
presenting his two principles of justice to show how the first
principle, equal basic liberties, must be coupled with principles
that ensure some minimum of material resources in order for
citizens to exercise their liberties. Brettschneider similarly
says that to ensure that the right of free expression has real
worth, the state must ensure “the minimum means for citizens
to be able to resist democratic persuasion.”27 Under certain
circumstances, the withdrawal of state funding from groups
espousing hateful viewpoints is tantamount to pulling the
“minimum means” out from under them. This is ultimately an
empirical question, but such cases may be more widespread than
Brettschneider seems to assume.
Consider the case of the Christian Legal Society (CLS)
at U.C. Hastings College of Law.28 The public university denied
funding to the student group on the grounds that CLS held
discriminatory beliefs regarding homosexuality, but Hastings
continued to permit the group to meet and speak on campus.
Brettschneider endorses the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision that
the university did not violate the right of free speech when it
refused to subsidize the group, but he disagrees with the Court’s
reasoning. The Court focused on which side respected the
viewpoint neutrality requirement in funding. Brettschneider
argues that the appropriate standard is the idea of free and equal
citizenship, which is not viewpoint-neutral. As he puts it, there is
no “entitlement for a particular viewpoint to be successful” and
27 Id. at 113.
28 Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v.
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
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“that hateful or discriminatory organizations have no right to
be subsidized by the state.”29
To raise some questions about the “worth” of the rights
of free speech and association, let us stylize the example. What if
CLS had been the only Christian student organization at the
school and it would have ceased to exist as an organization
without university support? Under such circumstances, in which
state funding is necessary to ensure the minimum worth of basic
liberties of Christian students, should CLS receive funding? From
the neutralists’ perspective, withholding state subsidies under
such circumstances would be objectionably coercive. But if
Brettschneider’s approach were to permit state subsidy in such
circumstances, would he thereby throw the ideal of free and
equal citizenship under the bus, revealing just how extreme his
commitment to robust speech protections is? The neutralists would
cheer as the prohibitionists would recoil in horror.
My second argument aimed at casting doubt on
Brettschneider’s claim that the state’s use of subsidies is mere
persuasion is inspired by John Stuart Mill’s account of coercion.
Mill’s account is more expansive than most contemporary
accounts. He links coercion with the state’s power to punish
lawbreakers, but he also suggests a wider range of tools, beyond
the use or threat of force, with which agents can exercise
constraining power over others. Coercion involves not only the
means of “physical force in the form of legal penalties” but also
“the moral coercion of public opinion.”30 Mill suggests that the
power of social stigma is more potent than the use or threat of
physical force:
For a long time past, the chief mischief of the legal penalties is that they
strengthen the social stigma. It is that stigma which is really
effective . . . . In respect to all persons but those whose pecuniary
circumstances make them independent of the good will of other people,
opinion, on this subject, is as efficacious as law . . . . Our merely social
intolerance kills no one, roots out no opinions, but induces men to
disguise them or to abstain from any active effort for their diffusion.31
What Brettschneider calls “persuasion” is coercion on
Mill’s account. Even if you reject Mill’s more expansive view of
coercion, after re-reading these passages of Mill, it is hard to deny
that the state’s use of social stigma and appeal to public opinion
29 BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 112, 114.
30 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett
Publishing Co., Inc. 1978) (1859).
31 Id. at 30-31.
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can be a more potent threat to individual liberty than legal
penalties. Brettschneider explicitly draws on Mill as an
inspiration for extending the powers of persuasion from the
citizenry to the state itself,32 but it is important to remember
that Mill himself favored an active citizenry, not the state,
taking the lead in persuading fellow citizens to transform norms
and practices. Viewed through this Millian lens, Brettschneider’s
“transformative theory,” in which “the state seeks to transform
religious belief” (and other personal beliefs) incompatible with free
and equal citizenship, sounds more threatening to individual
liberty than the use of direct bans and penalties.33
CONCLUSION: WALKING THE LIBERAL TIGHTROPE
Perhaps the greatest virtue of Brettschneider’s position is
the source of its greatest weakness: he paves a middle path
between the extremes of the Hateful Society and the Invasive
State, but in doing so, he has given us an approach riddled by an
uneasy tension between respecting liberty and promoting equality.
Both sides have reasons to fear that he gives with one
hand what he takes away with the other. To neutralists, he
appears to embrace robust rights protections, only to endanger
them through democratic “persuasion” aimed at changing
personal beliefs and practices. Religious believers may favor
old-fashioned neutralists to Brettschneider’s approach when
they realize that the latter would devote tax dollars toward
“attempting to transform” any discriminatory beliefs they may
hold! To prohibitionists, including some feminists, Brettschneider
advocates the state’s “active” role in criticizing and even
condemning hateful viewpoints, only to permit groups espousing
hateful viewpoints, such as the Westboro Baptist Church, to
speak out and stage protests.
This tension between respecting liberty and promoting
equality is endemic to liberalism. It is the tightrope liberals have
to walk. No self-respecting liberal can afford to give up on either.
While there are moments when Brettschneider’s approach seems
to lean more to one side or the other, his book is a serious effort
at reconciling these twin values and deserves to be widely read
and discussed.
32 BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 13.
33 Id. at 155, 157-58.
